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The  Rural  Tax and Fee  Reform
Since the early 1990s, the number of rural protests,petitions, and large-scale riots has been rapidly ris-ing, causing deep worry in the top echelon of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). According to official
figures, the number of “mass incidents” increased 28
percent between 2003 and 2004 alone.((2) As excessive
extraction of fees and taxes and illegal farmland seizures
are the main reasons for these problems in rural China,
efforts have been made to reduce the peasant burden,
improve local governance, and reduce the ever-increasing
wealth gap by developing the countryside. The Rural
Tax and Fee Reform (nongcun shuifei gaige; henceforth:
RTFR) is the latest of these efforts, and the name be-
lies the scope of institutional change it has come to en-
tail. 
In spite of what the name implies, the RTFR was more than
a minor policy aimed at reducing farmers’ financial burdens
by standardising fiscal extraction and gradually phasing out
agricultural taxes.((3) Policy-makers realised that sustained
burden reduction could not be achieved without substantive
institutional change. As one document put it: 
The Rural Tax and Fee Reform not only implies the
regulation of the distributive relationship between
national and peasant income; it is a major transfor-
mation of the village superstructure.((4)
One crucial component of the reform package, the so-called
“complementary reforms” (peitao gaige),((5) represents an ef-
fort at local-level institution-building unprecedented since the
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This paper focuses on the distributive effects of the Rural Tax and Fee Reform on county-level aggregate peasant
burden, peasant income, and government finances in China’s Anhui Province. It seeks to answer the question of
whether the reform has changed the structural determinants of peasant per capita income and government revenue.
It further tackles the question of who actually benefited during the reform period, who did not, and if the changes in
average county-level peasant per capita income (PPCI) and government receipts were indeed results of the reform, or
if they were brought about by other, unrelated factors. 
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establishment of the communes in the late 1950s. The
RTFR was aimed not only at restructuring, but also at build-
ing anew local-level government structures with the ultimate
aim of improving state distributive performance and thus de-
fusing the critical situation caused by what is commonly
known as the “three rural problems” (san nong wenti).((6)
The RTFR has proceeded in four stages to date. Between
1993 and 2000, more than 50 counties in seven provinces
experimented with alternative tax and fee models. Due to a
policy blunder committed by then-premier Zhu Rongji, most
of these experiments had to be suspended in 1998.((7) Two
years later, however, the central government presented a
compulsory reform model that was initially implemented
only in Anhui Province. This policy mandated the abolition
of most regular and irregular fees, offset by tripling the agri-
cultural tax. Despite the grave problems that the steep reduc-
tion of local fiscal revenue caused Anhui Province during
the first two reform years, the policy was extended to trial
counties across China and was finally implemented nation-
wide in 2003. At this point, official statistics put the average
burden reduction at 45.8 percent.((8)
Because the reform bore serious flaws, however, actual bur-
den reduction was actually far below this percentage in many
places and for many individuals, with local economic develop-
ment being, according to Bernstein and Lü, the major inter-
vening variable.((9) This prompted policymakers to announce
grain subsidies and the gradual phasing out of the agricultural
tax and the agricultural special products tax in early 2004,
only one year after the initial policy was implemented nation-
wide. Tax and fee burden dropped another 44.3 percent be-
tween 2003 and 2004, to only 1.3 percent of total average
peasant income.((10) In order to compensate for the resulting
losses, the next step was to forcibly implement the so-called
“complementary reforms.” Townships and towns were or-
dered to reduce personnel; townships and villages were
merged, as were primary and secondary schools. Local bu-
reaucracies were to be restructured, administration to be ren-
dered more transparent and efficient, responsibilities and re-
sources to be redistributed.((11) So far, however, with the excep-
tion of the mergers of villages and of townships, these reforms
have been successfully circumvented by most counties, and
where they have been implemented, they have actually
yielded no significant reduction in outlays. Instead, central-
level subsidies have been increased steeply in order to bail out
the severely indebted counties, townships, and villages. 
A great number of studies describe the adverse effects
brought forth by the reform. In particular, many grassroots
governments were deprived of vital fiscal resources, which
seriously affected local service provision. As John James
Kennedy shows, many township governments were “hol-
lowed out” by the reform and found themselves forced to
limit the provision of already precarious social services such
as compulsory education, social security payments, and med-
ical subsidies.((12) Brandt et al.’s survey of 50 towns and 100
villages in five provinces confirms that “the fiscal reforms
have undermined, or at least not improved, the current budg-
etary condition of townships.”((13) Most importantly, their
study shows that the impact of the reform varied significantly
across China and between richer and poorer townships.
This is confirmed by other surveys as well.((14) Clearly, the
aggregate burden reduction figures cited above are not an ac-
curate reflection of the impact of RTFR on government and
society at the county level and below. 
Because a thorough investigation of the implementation
process of the RTFR and its effects on local governance and
central-local relations has been made elsewhere,((15) this
paper seeks to deepen our understanding of the reform
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process and its outcomes by focusing on the distributive ef-
fects of the reform on the aggregate peasant burden, peas-
ant income, and government finances at the county level in
China’s Anhui Province. This level of analysis has been
chosen mainly because comprehensive data for the town-
ship and village level is not available. That being said, most
townships suffered from the impacts of the RTFR, and
bearing in mind that even townships within one county dis-
play widely differing levels of development, such an analy-
sis might at first seem unsatisfactory. Allowing for these
limitations, other reasons favour such an analysis. First and
foremost, unlike all other administrative levels except for
the centre, the county enjoys considerable discretion in de-
signing and implementing policies. Understanding how in-
ternal and external factors affect policy-making at this level
is crucial for delineating the potential of the county to im-
plement coherent policies. Second and relatedly, the ex-
tent to which a county government is affected determines
its ability to level out the negative effects of the reform on
townships, villages, and even households. To sum up, the
county must be considered the primary local-level develop-
ment agency, and analysis will provide insights not only
into the nature and determinants of differences within
counties, but also into the factors that hinder or further
their ability to adequately play the role of an agent of de-
velopment.
The first part of this paper is descriptive and outlines the ag-
gregate changes in peasant burden, peasant per capita in-
come, and government receipts during all phases of the re-
form. As these sections will make clear, peasant burden has
decreased and peasant income increased, but considerable
variation underlies these changes. The same is true for gov-
ernment finances.  The second part statistically analyses
data for Anhui’s 61 counties in order to provide explanations
for these phenomena. First, it seeks to answer the question
of whether the reform has changed the structural determi-
nants of peasant per capita income and government revenue,
for example by financially strengthening those regions that
were primarily dependent on agriculture. Second, it tackles
the question of who actually benefited during the reform pe-
riod, who did not, and if the changes in average county-level
peasant per capita income (PPCI) and government receipts
were indeed results of the reform, or if they were brought
about by other, unrelated factors. The last question concerns
governments that were able to increase their expenditures ei-
ther because they were able to shoulder the reform costs or
because they received additional transfer payments: Given
the new focus on rural development, have their expenditure
structures changed?  Aggregate development of peasant income and governmentfinances, 1999-2005
This section provides a glimpse of peasant burden, peasant
income, government revenue, government expenditures, and
spending on social services one year before the reform
began (1999), in the year preceding the decision to scrap
the agricultural tax (2003), and after the tax was abandoned
almost everywhere in Anhui (2005). However, such de-
scriptive statistics do not prove that these changes were a di-
rect or even indirect result of the RTFR. Indeed, negative
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indicators might be the result of external factors as diverse
as China’s WTO accession in 2001, the severe flood that
swept across the country in 2003, or even policies imple-
mented concurrently. It is possible that the reform mitigated
the impact of such events, even if indicators suggest other-
wise. Conversely, increasing peasant per capita income
might not be a result of the reform, but of increased migrant
labour. Such causalities will be addressed by inferential sta-
tistics in the second part of the paper. 
As Table 1 shows, the reform significantly reduced the peas-
ant burden in Anhui’s 61 counties already during the first re-
form phase.
Extractions from Anhui’s farmers fell from an average of 110
RMB per person to 59 RMB, a decrease of around 47 per-
cent. At the same time, however, the margin of affectedness
became wider. Although average burden declined drastically
between 1999 and 2003, the standard deviation from this
average for all 61 counties remained almost constant. These
two values can be used to construct an “coefficient of varia-
tion.” If the standard deviation is low in relation to the mean,
this average comes close to the actual situation in most coun-
ties. If the standard deviation as a percentage of the average
rises, however, this means that an increasingly large margin
underlies that average. When applied to peasant burden, we
see that it became more unequal across the 61 counties. The
standard deviation equalled 17.2 percent of the average in
1999, but rose to 28.4 percent in 2003.   
An examination of peasant income at these three points in
time yields a similar picture. On the one hand, average
PPCI grew steadily from an average of 1,972 RMB per per-
son in 1999 to 2,087 RMB four years later, and to 2,702
RMB in 2005. At the same time, however, income inequal-
ity increased. This can again be gauged from the coefficient
of variation, which increased from 17.7 percent in 1999 to
23.6 percent in 2003, and continued to rise slightly until
2005. 
As for revenues and expenditures, what strikes the analyst
first is that total per capita revenue decreased between 1999
and 2005 (with a sharp drop in 2003), but that per capita
budgetary expenditures more than doubled during the same
time period (Table 2). 
In fact, what characterises the reform period is that the ratio
of county revenues to expenditures increased rather steeply
after 1998. While Anhui’s county-level expenditures ex-
ceeded revenues by an average of around 27 percent in
1998, this ratio increased more than ten-fold within only
seven years!((16) Applying the “coefficient of variation” intro-
duced above, we can see that revenue inequality increased
61N o  2 0 0 8 / 2











steadily throughout the reform period, and especially  when
the new agricultural tax was gradually being abandoned. Ex-
penditure inequality rose just as steeply during the first re-
form phase, but not nearly as dramatically in the second
phase. Hence, during the first reform phase, the gaps in av-
erage peasant per capita income across Anhui widened, and
revenue and expenditure inequality at the county govern-
ment level increased. When the agricultural tax was gradu-
ally rescinded, the picture changed. Although the inequali-
ties did not level out, they didn’t increase as steeply as be-
fore.  The  structural  determinants  of  peasant  income and government revenue
What caused these differences and changes? The following
sections seek to provide explanations that account for the dif-
ferences outlined above. In particular, they test two interre-
lated hypotheses: first, that differences in development are a
function of structural factors preceeding the reform. In other
words, unequal development has been path-dependent and
is unrelated either to the Rural Tax and Fee Reform or to
other policies. Second, that the differences were brought
about by the reform policies. In order to explore these alter-
native explanations statistically, a decision must first be
made on how to operationalise such “structural” variables,
and what other variables to include. For example, a higher
PPCI in Eastern Anhui might have been caused by in-
creased economies of scale in agriculture, by peasants mi-
grating to the wealthy neighbouring provinces, or by im-
proved opportunities to engage in sideline occupations.
Other variables might be responsible as well, such as socio-
economic and socio-structural factors, involvement in sectors
other than agriculture, the social infrastrucure, or natural dis-
asters. 
However, running a linear regression that includes all of
these indicators would prove fruitless for two reasons: first,
including such a large number of variables violates the prin-
ciple of parsimony, which calls for explaining as much as
possible with a model as simple as possible. Second, and
more importantly, some of these variables might be inter-cor-
related, which would skew the outcome and possibly render
it meaningless.
In order to reach the dual goal of providing a parsimonious
explanation without excluding any of these variables, I will
analyse them by means of a factor analysis that includes
county-level data listed in the Statistical Yearbook of Anhui
Province as well as data I was able to obtain from the Min-
istry of Finance of Anhui Province. These include various
indicators for the economic structure (GDP per capita, per-
centage of GDP of the three sectors in the local economy;
primary, secondary, and tertiary GDP per capita); for the
level of socio-economic development (peasant household
S p e c i a l  f e a t u r e
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size, the amount of land each person cultivates, the percent-
age of persons of the total population not engaged in agricul-
ture, the percentage of wages in peasant income, and the
acreage each person sows; employment of agricultural ma-
chinery); and more general developmental indicators (access
to electricity, access to drinking water, connection to roads).
Table 3 summarises the resulting analysis for the pre-reform
year 1999.
The factor analysis reveals that there is indeed significant
correlation between the considered variables. Only two com-
ponents explain about 62 percent of their variation. Factor 1
alone explains 37 percent, and table 3 shows that this factor
is associated particularly closely with the local economic
structure. It correlates very highly with all indicators for non-
agricultural economic development in general, and with in-
dustrialisation in particular. Interestingly, this factor corre-
lates negatively with the relative size of the primary sector,
indicating that industrialisation and agriculture are mutually
exclusive. As the analysis reveals, this factor also correlates
significantly with development indicators such as access to
drinking water, the share of the population not engaged in
agriculture, rural household size, and electricity use per
capita. This illustrates the large impact of a viable industrial
sector for China’s development, and it simultaneously illus-
trates that the size of the tertiary sector does not play a de-
termining role in this respect. 
Since Factor 2 correlates very highly with land per person
and the sown acreage per person, and also with the amount
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of agricultural machinery employed per peasant and the pri-
mary GDP per person, economies of scale in agriculture
most likely underlie the second factor. It is interesting to note
that the relative size of wage receipts in peasant per capita
income correlates negatively with this factor, suggesting that
peasants in agriculture-intensive regions are not likely to seek
or obtain employment elsewhere. Thus, the initial 17 struc-
tural variables have been reduced to merely two, namely
non-agricultural economic development and economies of
scale in agriculture. Did these structural parameters change
in the course of the two reform stages? As Table 4 shows,
this was not the case. 
As can be seen from Table 4, the factor analysis extracts pre-
cisely the two variables that were obtained for the year
1999. There is one remarkable difference in the correlations
of the individual variables with the two factors: the wage
variable correlated positively with the first factor and nega-
tively with the second. However, while the negative correla-
tion with agricultural economies of scale became less signif-
icant over the years, the positive correlation with industriali-
sation increased. This might signify that in industrialised re-
gions, peasant income increasingly depends on wages. 
How well can these factors explain variations in burden re-
duction, peasant income, and government revenue and ex-
penditure? I will start by looking at their effect on PPCI and
then proceed to analyse their interrelationship with govern-
ment revenue and expenditure. Table 5 provides the Pear-
son correlation coefficients for the bivariate correlation of
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these two factors and PPCI in 1999. In addition, it tests the
relationship of PPCI with two other important non-structural
variables, namely peasant burden and natural disasters (per-
centage of total sown area that was affected by flood and
drought). Furthermore, since the relationship of the percent-
age of wages to total income to the two factors has changed
so remarkably, it will be included in the analysis as a sepa-
rate variable.   
As Table 5 shows, PPCI in 1999 correlates most signifi-
cantly with an industrialised economy. Contrary to expecta-
tions, there is no strong correlation between agricultural
economies of scale and PPCI. Nor, it is interesting to note,
is the average peasant burden level statistically related to this
variable. In other words, high average peasant per capita
burden does not automatically lead to low average PPCI,
and vice versa. This is a very significant finding, given the
common assumption that high peasant burden tends to lead
to stagnation of peasant income. It verifies the hypothesis
put forward in section four (see “Explaining the changes in
peasant income and government finances”) that it is income
inequality that makes peasant burden a problem, and not the
amount of fiscal extractions per se. Since the county-level ag-
gregate figures employed here do not reflect this inequality,
they do not correlate with the size of peasant burden. As
might be expected, however, the percentage of sown crops
destroyed by flood and drought correlates negatively with
peasant per capita income. The relative size of wages in
gross PPCI, however, did not seem to determine the level
of PPCI in 1999.   
Did these structural parameters change in the first and sec-
ond reform phases? Table 6 suggests that this was not the
case. 
On the contrary, the relationship between PPCI and indus-
trialisation became even stronger. Agricultural economies of
scale, which had not played a significant role to begin with,
became even less important. As might be expected, peasant
burden did not become important after it had been reduced
so much. On the other hand, the proportion of wages in
peasant gross revenue started to play a role in 2003. Finally,
as might have been expected, natural disasters correlated
with PPCI in 2003, but the same is not true for 2005. This
is probably due to the fact that Anhui was hit by a severe
flood in 2003, which affected harvests especially in the west-
ern and southern parts of the province, but no comparable
disasters were registered for 2005. 
As for total government revenues (including agricultural
levies and fees), Table 7 also identifies the level of industrial
development as the major determining variable, and the re-
lationship seems to have become even stronger during the
reform period (Column 1). 
While the variation in non-agricultural economic develop-
ment corresponded with 58 percent of the variation in gov-
ernment per capita revenue in 1999, the percentage steadily
increased to 61 percent in 2003 and 67 percent in 2005.((17)
The table also shows that, as opposed to 1999, high agricul-
tural economies of scale started to have a slightly negative in-
fluence on government revenue after the first reform step
(Column 2). Obviously, industry-heavy counties fared in-
creasingly better throughout the reform, while counties
where comparatively large plots predominated lost out. As
can be seen, these counties were stigmatised during the first
reform phase. 
As for the relationship between peasant income, peasant
burden, and government revenue, the correlations clearly in-
dicate that revenue tended to be high where PPCI was high
as well (Column 3). Since nearly 90 percent of the popula-
tion at the county level or below is registered as “agricultural
population” in the Statistical Yearbooks, this is not surpris-
ing; peasants are the chief source of government receipts at
this level, and high peasant income is reflected in higher gov-
ernment revenues. However, per capita receipts from agri-
cultural taxes have always been much lower than per capita
receipts from industry- and service-related taxes, and coun-
ties relying chiefly on agricultural taxes and with few or no
other sources of income tended to be poorer than those en-
dowed with a large percentage of non-agricultural receipts
(Column 4). Dependence on peasant burden was therefore
a hallmark of the relatively poorer counties. The same logic
applies to per capita expenditures. This confirms the obser-
vation made by Thomas Bernstein and Xiaobo Lü that local
economic development has been the major intervening vari-
able determining the impact of efforts to reduce peasant bur-
den.((18) Prosperous provincial-level “Eastern” (dongbu) gov-
ernments such as Shanghai, Guangdong, or Jiangsu, with a
sound non-agricultural revenue base, could easily bear the
cost of the reforms, while most counties in the so-called
“Central” (zhongbu) provinces depended mainly on extrac-
tions from peasants for revenue. As the previous paragraph
has shown, these observations also hold true at the county
level. Naturally, this situation had changed by 2005; almost
all rural taxes and fees had been rescinded, and expendi-
tures had to be funded from other sources.  
65N o  2 0 0 8 / 2
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Against this background, an interesting picture emerges with
regards to transfer payments (calculated as the percentage of
expenditures surpassing revenues). In 1999, the size of
transfer payments correlated only weakly with government
per capita revenue. Table 7 does not make clear what did
determine these transfer payments, but there seems to have
been a slight tendency for them to be higher in those coun-
ties with a low average PPCI. However, the determinants of
transfer payments changed dramatically in the course of the
reform, and have increasingly benefited those counties
where government per capita revenue is low. Since these
also tend to be counties dominated by agriculture and where
peasants earn comparatively little, they can be considered
structural subsidies. Graph 1 visualises the relationship by
government per capita revenue and transfer payments in
2005 and contrasts it with the situation in 1999.
While the variation in per capita revenue explained only 9
percent of the variation in transfer payments (r-square= 0.09)
in 1999, the two variables largely corresponded six years later.
In 2005, the size of per capita revenue explained 66.1 percent
of the variation in transfer payments (r-square= 0.661).Explaining  the changes  inpeasant  income and govern-ment finances
Comparison of the parameters determining peasant income
with government revenues and expenditures shows that
there was much continuity, but also some change. PPCI has
been high in relatively industrialised counties, and the aver-
age size of the peasant burden did not determine average
PPCI. In a similar vein, the parameters determining per
capita government revenue and expenditures have remained
remarkably constant. On the other hand, however, a regu-
larised fiscal transfer system was clearly being put into place.
These observations do not imply that the reform was with-
out impact. After all, the parameters just described can only
be changed over an extended period of time, and their re-
silience should not be interpreted as stasis. They do not
deny the far-reaching changes described above, but merely
show that the reform has not yet changed the structural foun-
dations of peasant income and government revenue. Hence,
it is necessary to go one step beyond the structural founda-
tions, and take a closer look at the changes that occurred.   
First of all, peasant burden, which had been substantial in
northern and central Anhui, was first reduced, and then to-
tally rescinded. Second, PPCI and county-level expendi-
tures increased dramatically between 1999 and 2005, even
if government revenue did not. In addition, the changes in
PPCI and government receipts and expenditures were far
from uniform. The following sections set out to explain these
changes. In particular, they seek to determine whether these
changes were the intended or unintended consequences of
the RTFR, or if they were caused by structural path de-
pendencies strong enough to render the reform policies in-
significant. Since the reform proceeded in two stages, the
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outcomes of the two stages and their determinants will be
compared rather than merely contrasting the status quo ante
and the status quo post. In particular, such a comparison
might yield further evidence as to why initial reform design
had been abandoned. I will first seek to determine whether
the changes in PPCI can be explained by the impact of bur-
den reduction, or if they had other causes. In particular,
three sets of indicators are tested for their impact on PPCI
change between 1999 and 2003, and between 2003 and
2005: the direct impact of the RTFR (measured by the de-
crease of peasant per capita burden); economic growth in
the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors (measured by
the increase of GDP per capita in each sector); and in-
creases in wage- and non-wage per capita income (Table 8).   
Table 8 yields several interesting results. First, the most im-
portant determinant of PPCI growth between 1999 and
2003 was the per capita increase in primary sector GDP.
This is not astonishing, since the peasants are of course its
main producers. In addition, there is a clear relationship be-
tween burden reduction and PPCI growth, although not as
might have been expected; in fact, there was a tendency to-
ward more modest PPCI increases where burden was re-
duced significantly. Obviously, there must be one or more
intervening variables that have a positive impact on burden
reduction, but a negative impact on PPCI growth. What is
important for this analysis, however, is that per capita bur-
den reduction did not have a direct impact on average PPCI
increase. This gives further weight to the hypothesis that the
“peasant burden problem” mainly affected the low-income
strata, while the richer peasants were able to shoulder the
extractions reasonably well. Income inequality is substantial
not only across Anhui, but also within individual counties.
Since the figures for PPCI employed are county averages,
they tend to hide these inequalities. 
As for the second phase, there was again no connection be-
tween the burden level and PPCI increase, as the low cor-
relation coefficient shows. However, Table 8 supports the
observation made above that wage income has increasingly
become a crucial determinant of PPCI increase. This con-
firms the findings of an internal report of Anhui’s Statistical
Bureau, which states that 85 percent of the increase in peas-
ant income has been the result of migrant labour wages. On
the other hand, there is a significant correlation between the
increase in PPCI and non-wage income as well, which
might be due to the fact that peasants have received subsides
for planting non-cash crops since 2004, and that agricultural
production has increased markedly since 2003 after having
fallen to a historical low.   
What effect did the two reform phases have on government
revenues and expenditures? Again, changes will be tested
for the impact of the reform policies and of economic devel-
opment. In addition, the development of peasant gross in-
come, the primary tax source base until the second reform
phase set in, will also be included in the analysis (Table 9).   
In the first phase of the RTFR, there are some similarities
to the impacts observed with respect to peasant burden,
which is probably due to the fact that PPCI and government
revenue were so closely correlated (see Column 5). Again,
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the less burden was reduced, the more government revenue
per capita tended to increase, and the development of pri-
mary, rather than secondary, GDP per capita correlated
with increases in government revenue. In general, the devel-
opment of government per capita revenue tended to follow
PPCI, which again is not surprising. 
In the second phase, however, these variables loose their ex-
planatory power. Government revenue increase is generally
correlated neither with burden reduction nor with economic
development. This may be due to the fact that the develop-
ment of per capita revenue during the second phase clearly
followed a regional pattern. Revenue in the northwest was
further reduced, while increasing in most counties in the
south and east. Very probably, different factors underlay
these developments. Hence, it might be wise to concentrate
on the counties where we would expect the reform to have
had an especially significant effect, anticipating that counties
with revenue mainly dependent on peasant burden would
have been hit the hardest. Astonishingly, this assumption is
proven false, at least for the first phase. The percentage of
peasant burden in total revenue does not significantly corre-
late with the development of government per capita revenue
during the first phase, and high dependence on peasant bur-
den did not automatically lead to a decrease in government
revenue during the first reform phase. In the second phase,
however, it was the single most potent variable correlating
with the development of revenue. It alone explains nearly 60
percent of the variation in per capita government revenue
between 2003 and 2005. Counties relying chiefly on peas-
ant burden for revenue clearly faced severe revenue reduc-
tions, while those with other sources of revenue did not. 
Why does that not seem to hold true during the first phase
of the RTFR? Obviously, the assumption underlying this
statistical test, namely that the revenue reduction caused by
the RTFR is the single most potent factor in the change in
government revenue before and after the reform, is wrong.
In other words, along with, but rather unrelated to the
RTFR, a very significant increase or decrease in other rev-
enue items must have taken place. 
This hypothesis is not easy to test, since detailed data on
county-level revenue and expenditure items before the re-
form are not available. However, an analysis of prefecture-
level data might help. Indeed, a close examination reveals
two major changes that took place in 2000. First, the north-
western prefecture-level cities of Fuyang and Bozhou saw a
major restructuring. In 1999, Fuyang City supervised eight
county-level governments((19) and Bozhou City none, but
Bozhou was put in charge of three of Fuyang’s counties in
2000.((20) The shift does not seem to have been beneficial to
the financial situation of these cities. In 2000, their com-
bined receipts fell 29.8 percent compared with 1999, by far
the greatest loss any city faced during that crucial period. In
what revenue items did these losses materialise?
This brings us to the second point. Analysis reveals that rev-
enue from a budgetary item called the “tax for the adjust-
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19. Jieshou City, Linquan, Taihe, Guoyang, Mengcheng, Funan, Yingshang and Lixin Counties.
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ment of investments in fixed assets” (guding zichan touzi
fangxiang tiaojieshui) declined between 88 percent and 99
percent during the same period. The central government im-
plemented this tax in 1991 in response to the investment
boom of the 1980s. Requiring investors to pay amounts
ranging from 5 to 15 percent of their fixed investments to the
local governments, this tax was a macro-economic steering
instrument. While it might have been an appropriate means
to counter over-investment and cool down the overheated
economy at the time, the tax quickly became dysfunctional
as local economic development stagnated and governments
were encouraged to woo investors into their localities.((21)
The  decline in receipts from this tax was significant, given
that these receipts made up an average of almost 10 per-
cent of prefecture-level budgetary revenue (and was as
high as 15.4 percent in one prefecture). Of the six cities
whose dependence on this tax surpassed the average, only
two managed to increase their budgetary revenue during
this period, while the others stagnated (Suzhou; +0.6%) or
even declined (Xuancheng -2.8%; Maanshan -12.1%;
Bozhou and Fuyang combined: -29.8%). The two cities
that increased their budgetary revenue despite above-aver-
age dependence on this tax were more developed, and
clearly managed to shift the burden to the industrial sector;
receipts from enterprise income tax in both Wuhu and
Tongling City tripled within just one year. It is remarkable
that this reform has not been researched at all. The signif-
icance of the Adjustment Tax to the budgets of the more
developed regions can be likened to that of the agricultural
tax in the agricultural regions, and its abolition must have
had a great impact on both government finances and enter-
prise burden.
In summation, a rather complex picture emerges in which all
county-level governments faced revenue losses, but for differ-
ent reasons: for agriculture-heavy counties, the increase in
agricultural tax revenue in the first reform phase could not
offset the losses resulting from the abolition of agriculture-re-
lated levies and fees, and industry-heavy counties only
avoided similar losses from the abolition of the Adjustment
Tax by shifting the revenue burden to the industrial sector.
If receipts from the santi wutong and the education fee are
figured in, every single county faced revenue losses between
1999 and 2000 (see Graph 2). The fact that budgetary
growth rates were negative in only six of 17 prefecture-level
governments between 1999 and 2000 shows that they were
relatively able to shoulder this “double burden.” 
As can be seen, the losses are most significant in poor
north-western Anhui (in the left quadrant of the graph),
particularly in counties that were affected by the territorial
restructuring measures and that could not shift the “double
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(Further adjustment of implementation efforts and concrete measures of a pro-active
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burden” of the Agricultural and Adjustment Tax reforms
on a developed industry. Not incidentally, the eight coun-
ties most severely affected were listed among the least de-
veloped in almost all indicators in Anhui’s Statistical Year-
book 2006, with four of them qualifying as “national level
poor counties.”((22) The effect of abolition of the investment
adjustment tax is an issue that merits further attention. Un-
fortunately, due to lack of information and data, this topic
cannot be pursued further without conducting additional
fieldwork.
What is important for this study is that while expenditure
increases and decreases closely mirrored the development
of revenues during that phase, a regularised fiscal balancing
mechanism was gradually put into place later on. As Graph
3 below shows, the gap between revenues and expenditures
steadily increased, especially after the year 2000. In 2004,
the year when the agricultural tax began to be rescinded,
the expenditure-revenue ratio made another substantial
leap. In 2003, one year before it was scrapped, the agricul-
tural tax made up an average of 34 percent of county-level
revenue, and local governments had to be compensated for
this loss.      
Consequently, all counties were able to significantly in-
crease expenditure despite declining revenues throughout
the two reform phases. This brings us to the final question,
concerning expenditures.
Expenditures
Given that the centre’s policy focus has shifted to rural develop-
ment, and given that a large portion of transfer payments are di-
rectly or indirectly financed by the centre, we would expect to
see this shift in foci mirrored in the expenditure structure. In
general, expenditures for agricultural development, education,
health, and social security should increase faster than those for
other, non-rural development-oriented items. Furthermore, we
would expect the alleged success in personnel reduction to be
reflected in decreasing or at least stagnant administrative expen-
diture. In addition, it has been shown above that revenue-poor
counties benefited most from the transfer payments. Since, not
incidentally, revenue poverty correlated highly with peasant
poverty, we would expect the shift in expenditure to be even
stronger in these counties. Since expenditure increased in all
counties between 1999 and 2005, it would be useless to look
only at expenditure increases. Hence, the following section
analyses the percentage of particular expenditure items within
total expenditures, beginning with the identification of general
trends in expenditure priorities on the aggregate city and county
levels. It then proceeds to statistically analyse the impact of ex-
penditure increases on the expenditure structure for all 61 coun-
ties in general and on their dependence on transfer payments.    
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The following sections attempt to trace the development of
priority changes in public service spending during the period
in question. Changed spending patterns are treated as an in-
dicator of local government commitment to improving rural
development, although it should by no means be assumed
that increased public spending automatically leads to better
services in a particular sector.((23)
As Graph 4 shows, in terms of total budgetary expenditures,
education expenses have remained rather stable in Anhui
Province. If the cities are excluded, the ratio is of course
higher, yet displays a very similar trend (2000: 29.2%;
2002: 31.5%; 2005: 27.0%). Of course, absolute expendi-
ture for education has increased steeply, but so has expendi-
ture on the other items. Obviously, there has been no strong
shift in priorites for this item. This is astonishing given the
fact that the cost of providing compulsory education was
shifted from the township to the county level in 2001 and
must, at least in part,((24) be represented in budgetary expen-
diture figures. If the government kept its promise to shoulder
a larger portion of rural education expenditure, that is not re-
flected in these figures.  
The other social service-related expenditure items have
also remained quite stable over time. The only exception is
subsidies to social security programs, which declined
sharply between 1999 and 2002, with a less marked de-
cline since then. Remarkably, aggregate city-level expendi-
tures on health, support for underdeveloped areas, pen-
sions, and agriculture are far lower than the expenditures
for retirement pensions for administrative personnel. Simi-
larily, the provincial government spends only slightly more
on subsidies for social security programs for millions of
workers and peasants than it does on pensions for former
civil servants. It should be noted, however, that the expen-
diture share for government administration steadily de-
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23. Education is a good example. While scholars and the media alike lament the decline in
the quality of education in rural China, government statistics show that education is the
biggest expenditure item in Anhui Province, making up around 16 percent of aggregate
city-level expenditure and around one third of county-level expenditure. However, most
of this expenditure goes toward teachers’ salaries and not toward the improvement of
educational facilities or teacher training. In addition, the largest portion of such expen-
diture is spent on secondary and tertiary education, not on rural primary education.
24. Part of the cost may be met by earmarked funds received from the centre and that do
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clined at the aggregate city and the county level alike.
However, as was the case with all other expenditures, ab-
solute expenses increased rather sharply (18.2 percent be-
tween 2000 and 2001 alone, and 30.0 percent between
2003 and 2004).    
Statistical analysis confirms that neither the general increase
in expenditure nor the increase in transfer payments affected
the expenditure structure at the county level. As a general
rule, increased expenditure on all the items discussed so far
followed the general increase in expenditure, with no partic-
ular increases evident during the first phase (Table 10).   
Table 10 contrasts the change in expenditure structures dur-
ing the two phases((25) with corresponding increases in budg-
etary spending and transfer payments. In the first phase, the
slight changes in expenditure priorities observed above can-
not be explained by either the amount of expenditures or the
size of transfer payments. The only exception is education,
where expenditures tended to increase at a lower rate than
overall spending. In addition, there was a slight tendency for
counties receiving larger transfer payments to spend less on
public security. In the second phase, the picture changed
somewhat. Expenditure-rich counties display a comparative
neglect of spending on agriculture and social security, al-
though the corelation is quite weak. However, they tend to
spend more on items that are not individually listed in the
yearbook. Counties that benefited from large transfer pay-
ments in 2005 display a tendency, albeit a slight one, to
focus more on education and health.((26)
In conclusion, the assumptions put forward at the beginning
of this section have not been proven true. With the possible
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25. The change in expenditure structure denotes the percentage change of each expendi-
ture item in total expenditure calculated between 2000 and 2003 for the first phase, and
2003 and 2005 for the second.
26. Seemingly, capital construction has become a focus item as well. However, the correla-
tion is mainly caused by four extremely large values. If these are omitted, the relation-
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exception of education, where there was a slight tendency
for counties with large transfer payments to increase relative
spending, the central government’s focus on rural develop-
ment was not reflected in changed expenditure structures.
Again, this does not mean that nothing happened. First, ex-
penditure on items related to social services tended to in-
crease along with general increase in expenditure, so addi-
tional money was definitely being spent. Second, as Brandt
et al. point out, much investment in rural infrastructure was
being made via earmarked transfers from the centre that do
not appear in the regular budget.((27)Conclusion
Summing up the observations made in the previous sections,
the following picture emerges. On the aggregate level, the
Rural Tax and Fee Reform has not had any impact at all on
aggregate county-level PPCI. Of course, this does not imply
that the reform did not achieve anything in this respect; it is
very likely that poor peasants did indeed benefit from the re-
duction in regular and irregular extractions. As Chen Xiwen
has shown, the regressive nature of the peasant burden had
its strongest effect on the poorest peasant strata, which lost
an average of more than 37 percent of its gross revenue to
taxes and fees.((28) For the richest strata, such deductions
amounted to less than 5 percent. What the data do imply,
however, is that the reduction of income inequality achieved
by the reform was outstripped by the increase in PPCI in
Anhui’s more prosperous regions. In other words, on the ag-
gregate county level, it was not the RTFR that increased
peasant incomes, but economic factors such as a growing pri-
mary sector in wealthy regions and income from non-agricul-
tural activities. 
As for development of fiscal revenues, the analysis has
shown that two non-interrelated factors were chiefly respon-
sible: first, the increase in peasant income, and second, tax
reductions. Low PPCI tended to cause low revenues, and
these revenues were even further reduced by the RTFR and
the tax adjustment reform. Hence, initially poor counties be-
came even poorer, while wealthier counties were able to
shoulder the losses incurred through the reform by mobilis-
ing other revenue. Geographically, this led to an amplifica-
tion of Anhui’s south-north divide. Since the initial reform
design had not anticipated transfer payments and basically
demanded that counties implement austerity policies to off-
set losses, the northern counties were even more disadvan-
taged. Their reluctance and probably also inability to imple-
ment such measures may be one of the chief reasons for the
failure of the initial reform design. Fortunately, abolition of
the agricultural tax forced the central government to address
this situation, and a mechanism of transfer payments bene-
fited revenue-poor counties over their wealthier counter-
parts. In fact, every single county spent more in 2005 than
it earned, but the margin underlying the size of transfer pay-
ments was huge. 
Remarkably, the centre has not taken advantage of its in-
creased and unintended financial involvement in the reform
to influence the expenditure structure of the subsidised
counties. While comparatively higher spending on items re-
lated to the provision of social services would have been ex-
pected, especially in those counties profiting most from
transfer payments, this assumption was proven false. Either
this change in focus was operationalised outside the regular
budget by means of earmarked transfers, as Brandt et al.
have found, or other factors related to the structure of cen-
tral-local relations were at work.•   
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27. Loren Brandt et al., “China- Rural Public Finance. The Township Perspective,” op. cit.
28. Chen Xiwen, Zhongguo xian xiang caizheng yu nongmin zengshou wenti yanjiu (Re-
search on public finances in China’s counties and townships and the problem of in-
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